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MUNICIPAL LIABILITY UNDER SECTION 1983
INDEPENDENT OF EMPLOYEE LIABILITY
Karen M. Blum'
I will focus on the question of whether there can be
municipal liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,2 absent a finding of a
constitutional violation on the part of an individual, non-
policymaking, employee. Although I have addressed this question
in depth elsewhere,3 the issue remains a source of confusion for
courts and litigants, and the case law continues to reflect that
confusion. An essential starting point is the Supreme Court's
decision in City of Los Angeles v. Heller.4 Heller brought suit
against the City of Los Angeles, as well as individual police
officers, alleging that the officers violated his constitutional rights
by arresting him without probable cause and by using excessive
1 Professor of Law, Suffolk University Law School; B.A., Wells College,
J.D., Suffolk University Law School, LL.M., Harvard Law School. Professor
Blum teaches Civil Procedure, Civil Rights, Federal Courts, and Police
Misconduct Litigation. She participates in § 1983 programs and institutes
around the country and is a regular faculty lecturer for the Federal Judicial
Center. Professor Blum is a co-author, along with Michael Avery and David
Rudovsky, of Police Misconduct: Law and Litigation (3d Ed. 1996) and
Supplement.
2 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994 & Supp. 2001). Section 1983 provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the
District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any
citizen of the United States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and
laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law,
suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, except
that in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act
or omission taken in such officer's judicial capacity,
injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory
decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.
For the purposes of this section, any Act of Congress
applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be
considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia.
3 Karen M. Blum, Municipal Liability: Derivative or Direct? Distinguishing
the Canton Case from the Collins Case, 48 DEPAUL L. REv 687 (1999).
4 475 U.S. 796, cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1154 (1986).
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force in the course of the arrest.5 During the arrest, one of the
officers employed a chokehold to restrain Heller, and in the
resulting struggle, Heller fell through a plate glass window.6
Heller claimed that the officer's use of excessive force was in
accordance with the City's alleged custom of condoning the use
of excessive force. 7
The District Court judge bifurcated the trial, with the first
phase proceeding only against Officer Bushey on the excessive
force claim. 8 The jury, which did not receive instruction on any
affirmative defense of qualified immunity 9 or good faith,
rendered a general verdict in favor of the officer.'° The District
Court then dismissed the remaining claims against the City,
reasoning that without an underlying constitutional violation by
the individual officer, there could be no municipal liability. 1
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed on
the ground that the jury might have concluded that the officer
acted in good faith and simply followed departmental policy.
12
Such a determination would not be inconsistent with a finding of
5 Id. at 797.
61d.
7 Id. at 801 (Stevens, J. and Marshall, J., dissenting). Apparently, the Los
Angeles Police Department had an "escalating force" policy, which included
the use of chokeholds. At trial, the testimony of both officers who used the
chokehold, and a Los Angeles Police Sergeant, showed that the officer's
actions complied with established Department policy.
' Id. at 797.
9 A public official performing a discretionary function enjoys qualified
immunity in a civil action for damages, provided his or her conduct does not
violate clearly established federal statutory or constitutional rights of which a
reasonable person would have known. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800,
818 (1982). At the time Heller was decided, it was common practice in the
Ninth Circuit to instruct the jury on the affirmative defense of qualified
immunity. Since then, the Supreme Court has admonished that "immunity
ordinarily should be decided by the court long before trial." Hunter v.
Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 228 (1991) (per curiam).
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constitutional injury.13 Consequently, the Ninth Circuit held that
Heller could proceed with his claim against the City. 14
The United States Supreme Court reversed, holding that
without instructions to the jury on any affirmative defenses, there
could not be a presumption that the jury found for the officer
based on a good faith defense. 5 Since the officer did not inflict a
constitutional injury upon Heller, the Supreme Court reasoned
that there was no basis for holding the City liable, even if the
City's policy authorized the use of unconstitutional force. 16 The
per curiam opinion concluded that "[i]f a person does not suffer a
constitutional injury at the hands of the individual police officer,
the mere fact that the departmental regulations might have
authorized the use of constitutionally excessive force is quite
beside the point." 
17
Based on Heller, a number of courts have taken the
position that they will bifurcate the trial when the plaintiff sues
both the individual officers and the city.' 8 The theory is that
when a plaintiff sues an officer and loses because there is no
constitutional violation, the case is over. If the plaintiff prevails
against the officer, generally nothing further is to be gained by
proceeding against the city. In effect, the case still ends. 19 This
13 id.
14 Heller, 759 F.2d at 1376.
" Heller, 475 U.S. at 799.
16 Id. at 799. But see Id. at 803 (Stevens, J., dissenting)(opining that the jury
did not decide the constitutionality of the City's escalating force policy; thus,
there would be no inconsistency between a verdict in favor of the officer and
imposing liability on city).
" Id. at 799 (emphasis in original).
IS See, e.g., Treece v. Hochstetler, 213 F.3d 360, 365 (7th Cir. 2000)
(upholding the trial judge's discretion to bifurcate, especially in light of the
fact that the City agreed to the entry of judgment against itself should the jury
find the individual officer liable); Quintanilla v. City of Downey, 84 F.3d 353
(9th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1122 (1997). See generally Douglas
Colbert, Bifurcation of Civil Rights Defendants: Undermining Monell in Police
Brutality Cases, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 499 (1993).
19 But see Amato v. City of Saratoga Springs, 170 F.3d 311, 318-21 (2d Cir.
1999) (upholding bifurcation and the plaintiffs right to proceed against the
municipality for nominal damages, noting "a finding against officers in their
individual capacities does not serve all the purposes of, and is not the
2001
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approach often causes prejudice to plaintiffs. One reason for this
prejudice is that when an individual officer is sued, the rules of
evidence will preclude the introduction of certain evidence. For
example, prior bad acts or activities of other officers may be
admissible in an action against a municipality to prove a case of
inadequate training or failure to discipline an officer on the part
of a municipality. 20 However, this same evidence is inadmissible
where the action is against an individual officer. Evidence going
to proof of actual or constructive knowledge on the part of a
policy maker of a pattern or custom of constitutional violations
would likewise be inadmissible in a case against an officer.
The majority of circuits have construed Heller to demand
a dismissal of the Monell claim where there has been a finding of
no constitutional violation on the part of the individual officer.21
equivalent of, a judgment against the municipality"); Larez v. City of Los
Angeles, 946 F.2d 630 (9th Cir. 1991) (plaintiffs in a bifurcated trial were
"made whole" by compensatory damages against line officers, but were still
entitled to proceed against Police Chief for punitive damages); Medina v. City
of Chicago, 100 F. Supp. 2d 893, 896-98 (N.D. Ill. 2000) (noting the
advantages of bifurcation and the fact that "from an economic standpoint, a
prevailing plaintiff in a § 1983 excessive force case against police officers in
Illinois gets nothing more from suing the municipality under Monell than he
would get from suing just the officers," but also noting that bifurcation will
not avoid a second trial where the individual officer prevails on qualified
immunity; refusing to bifurcate, while issues of qualified immunity and City's
willingness to have judgment entered against it if the officer was found liable
were still on the table, but deferring discovery on Monell claim).
20 FED. R. EvID. 404(b).
21 See, e.g., Trigalet v. City of Tulsa, 239 F.3d 1150, 1156 (10th Cir.
2001), cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 40 (2001) ("[W]e hold that absent a
constitutional violation by the individual police officers whose conduct directly
caused plaintiffs' injuries, there can be no municipal liability imposed on the
City of Tulsa on account of its policies, customs, and/or supervision with
regard to the individual defendants"); Young v. City of Mount Ranier, 238
F.3d 567, 579 (4th Cir. 2001) ("The law is quite clear in this circuit that a
section 1983 failure-to-train claim cannot be maintained against a governmental
employer in a case where there is no underlying constitutional violation by the
employee"); Treece, 213 F.3d at 364 ("[B]ecause a jury has determined that
Hochstetler was not. liable for committing a constitutional deprivation (tort)
against Treece, it is impossible under existing case law for the City to be held
liable for its knowledge or inaction concerning its officer's activity"); Hayden
554 [Vol 17
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However, a line of cases in the Third Circuit has held, and other
circuits have suggested, that there may be municipal liability
based on a substantive due process claim, despite exoneration of
the officer employee.22 The Supreme Court adopted different
approaches in City of Canton v. Harris,23 and Board of
Commissioners of Bryan County v. Brown,24 in contrast to the
decisions in Collins v. City of Harker Heights,25 and County of
Sacramento v. Lewis. 6 The Court's reasoning with regard to the
question of municipal liability independent of employee liability
varied in these cases.
In City of Canton, the Court addressed the question of
whether a municipality could ever be liable under § 1983 for
constitutional violations resulting from a failure to train municipal
employees.27 The plaintiff in City of Canton had been arrested
and brought to the police station in a patrol wagon. Upon arrival
at the station, she repeatedly collapsed and was left on the floor
and given no medical assistance. After being released to her
v. Grayson, 134 F.3d 449, 455 (1st Cir. 1998) cert. denied, 524 U.S. 953
(1998) ("Normally... a municipality cannot be held liable unless its agent
actually violated the victim's constitutional rights").
22 See, e.g., Kneipp v. Tedder, 95 F.3d 1199, 1213 (3d Cir. 1996) ("The
precedent in our circuit requires the District Court to review the plaintiffs
municipal liability claims independently of the § 1983 claims against the
individual police officers, as the City's liability for a substantive due process
violation does not depend upon the liability of any police officer"); Fagan v.
City of Vineland, 22 F.3d 1283, 1292 (3d. Cir. 1994) (Fagan 1) ("A finding
of municipal liability does not depend automatically or necessarily on the
liability of a police officer"); Simmons v. City of Philadelphia, 947 F.2d
1042, 1058-65 (3d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 985 (1992) (There was
no inconsistency in the jury's determination that the police officer's actions did
not amount to a constitutional violation, while the City was found liable under
§ 1983 on the theory of policy of deliberate indifference to serious medical
needs of intoxicated and potentially suicidal detainees and the failure to train
officers to detect and meet such needs).
23 489 U.S. 378 (1989).
24 520 U.S. 397 (1997).
2 503 U.S. 115 (1992).
26 523 U.S. 833 (1998).
27 City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 380.
2001
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family, she was transported to a hospital where she was
diagnosed with a number of emotional ailments.28
Mrs. Harris brought suit under § 1983, claiming she was
deprived of her substantive due process right to be free from
deliberate indifference to her serious medical needs while in
police custody.29 She asserted a claim of municipal liability for
this deprivation based on a theory of "grossly inadequate
training." 30  The plaintiff presented evidence of a municipal
regulation, that established a policy that gave police shift
commanders complete discretion to make decisions as to whether
prisoners were in need of medical care. 31  The evidence also
demonstrated that such commanders received no training or
guidelines to assist them in making such judgments. 32 The United
States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit upheld the adequacy
of the District Court's jury instructions on the issue of municipal
liability for inadequate training.33 The court stated that the
plaintiff could succeed on her claim of municipal liability for
failure to train its police force, "[where] the
plaintiff... prove[s] that the municipality acted recklessly,
intentionally, or with gross negligence." 
34
The Supreme Court unanimously rejected the City's
argument that municipal liability can be imposed only where the
challenged policy is unconstitutional, and concluded that "there
are limited circumstances in which an allegation of a 'failure to
train' can be the basis for liability under § 1983. "' Noting the
substantial disagreement among the lower courts as to the level of
culpability required in failure-to-train cases, the Court went on to
hold that "the inadequacy of [training policy] may serve as the
basis for § 1983 liability only where the failure to train amounts
to deliberate indifference to the rights of persons with whom the
281 d. at 381.
29 id.
30 d. at 383.
31 Id. at 382.
31 Id. at 381-82.
33 City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 388.34 Id. at 388.
31 Id. at 387.
556 [Vol 17
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police come into contact." 3 6 The Court was careful to note that
the "deliberate indifference" standard it was imposing as a matter
of statutory construction under § 1983 had nothing to do with the
level of culpability that may be required to make out the
underlying constitutional wrong. 37 Rather, it relates to what is
required-to establish the municipal policy as the "moving force"
behind the constitutional violation. 38 Given the state of the record
before the Supreme Court, it was assumed that the plaintiffs
substantive due process right had been violated. 39 The issue was
whether the given violation could be attributed to the City for
liability purposes under § 1983.
In Bryan County v. Brown, the Supreme Court revisited
the issue of municipal liability under § 1983 in the context of a
single bad-hiring decision made by a County Sheriff who was
stipulated to be the final policymaker for the County in matters of
law enforcement. 40  The plaintiff was injured when she was
forcibly extracted from a vehicle driven by her husband. Mr.
Brown was avoiding a police checkpoint and was eventually
stopped by a squad car in which Reserve Deputy Burns was
riding.4 ' Burns removed Mrs. Brown from the vehicle with such
force that he caused severe injury to her knees.42 The plaintiff
sued both Reserve Deputy Burns and the County under § 1983. 43
A panel of the Fifth Circuit affirmed the District Court's entry of
judgment on the jury's verdict against Reserve Deputy Burns for
excessive force, false arrest, and false imprisonment.44 The
36/Id. at 388.
37 Id. at 389.
38 Id. at 388 n.8. Note that while the court has held that § 1983 contains no
state-of-mind requirement, City of Canton does establish a deliberate
indifference state-of-mind requirement as an essential element of failure-to-
train claims, mandated not by the underlying constitutional violation, but by
the "causation" language of § 1983. Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 534
(1981).
'9 City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 388 n.8.
40 Bryan County, 520 U.S. at 388.
41 1d. at 400.
42 ld. at 401.
43 id.
44Bryan County, 67 F.3d at 1181.
2001
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majority of the panel also affirmed the judgment against the
County based on the sole decision of Sheriff Moore to hire Burns
without adequately investigating his background.45 The Fifth
Circuit concluded that Moore's inadequate screening and hiring
of Burns demonstrated "deliberate indifference to the public's
welfare. 
" 46
The Supreme Court, in a five to four decision written by
Justice O'Connor, reversed the Court of Appeals.47 The Court
distinguished Brown's case, which involved a claim that a single
lawful hiring decision ultimately resulted in a constitutional
violation, from a case where a plaintiff claimed that "a particular
municipal action itself violates federal law, or directs an
employee to do so. " 48 As the Court noted, its prior cases
recognizing municipal liability based on a single act or decision
attributed to the government entity, involved decisions of local
legislative bodies or policymakers that directly effected or
ordered someone to effect a constitutional deprivation.49 In this
"single bad hire" situation, the majority insisted on evidence
from which a jury could find that had Sheriff Moore adequately
screened Deputy Burns' background, he "should have concluded
that Burns' use of excessive force would be a plainly obvious
consequence of the hiring decision. " 5  In the view of the.
41 Id. at 1184.
46 Id. at 1185. Bums, the son of Sheriff Moore's nephew, had an extensive
"rap sheet," but the numerous violations and arrests included no felonies.
State law prohibited the Sheriffs hiring of an individual convicted of a felony,
but did not proscribe the hiring of someone like Bums.
47 Bryan County, 520 U.S. at 397.4 1Id. at 404.
49 See, e.g., Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469 (1986) (county
prosecutor gave an order that resulted in a constitutional violation); City of
Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247 (1981) (decision of city council
to cancel a license permitting a concert directly violated constitutional rights);
Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622 (1980) (city council discharged
employee without due process). In such cases, there are no real problems with
respect to the issues of fault or causation. See also Bennett v. Pippin, 74 F.3d
578, 586 & n.5 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 817 (1996) (County
held liable for Sheriffs rape of murder suspect, where Sheriff was a final
policymaker in matters of law enforcement).
50 d. at 412.
558 [Vol 17
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majority, scrutiny of Burns' record produced insufficient
evidence that a jury could have found that Sheriff Moore's hiring
decision reflected deliberate indifference to an obvious risk that
Burns would use excessive force. 51
In Bryan County, as in City of Canton, there was no
question that the non-policymaking employee had committed an
underlying constitutional violation. In both cases, the Court was
engaged in defining the level of culpability that plaintiffs would
have to prove to demonstrate municipal liability under § 1983 for
having "caused" the violation. In both Bryan County and City of
Canton, the Court discussed deliberate indifference as the
standard.52 However, this type of deliberate indifference is
distinguishable from the deliberate indifference the Court
established as the constitutional standard in Farner v. Brennan.
53
For a person in custody to make a Fourteenth Amendment or
Eighth Amendment constitutional deliberate indifference claim,
where medical needs or issues of safety or protection are
involved, the plaintiff must show subjective deliberate
indifference. 4  Such a showing requires proof of actual
knowledge of the serious medical need or the serious threat to the
person's safety or health.55 Further, the plaintiff must prove that
the defendant actually failed to take reasonable steps to abate that
risk or meet the serious medical need.56 What is required is
actual subjective knowledge in order to prove the constitutional
violation.57 However, to establish liability under § 1983, under
City of Canton deliberate indifference, objective deliberate
indifference suffices.58 It is a "knew or should have known"
standard. Therefore, if the plaintiff can demonstrate that the
defendant knew or should have known that its policy (or the
51 Id. at 415.
52 City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 388-90; Bryan County, 520 U.S. at 405-13.
13 511 U.S. 825, 832-37 (1994).
I" d. at 838-40.
5 Id. at 847.
56 id.
17 Id. at 826-32.
58 City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 380-87.
2001 559
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failure to have a policy) would result in some lower level official
violating constitutional rights, the defendant would be held liable.
The issue before the Court in Collins v. City of Harker
Heights,59 was not municipal responsibility for an officer's
unconstitutional conduct. Rather, the issue was whether a
constitutional violation occurred at all.60 In Collins, the wife of a
sanitation department worker brought suit against the City of
Harker Heights after her husband was asphyxiated while working
61on a sewer line. Mrs. Collins' claim against the City alleged
the City violated her husband's substantive due process rights by
failing to provide adequate training to its employees regarding the
risks of working in sewer lines as well as failing to provide safety
equipment, or safety warnings.62
A unanimous Supreme Court held that the plaintiff needed
to show that her harm was caused by a constitutional violation
and that the City was responsible for that violation.63 The Court
noted that City of Canton answered only the question of whether
the assumed underlying constitutional violation could be
attributed to the municipality.64 In Collins, the Court assumed,
for purposes of this decision, that the plaintiff sufficiently alleged
that the City was responsible for the harm to Collins based on a
theory other than respondeat superior liability.65
Turning to the issue of whether unconstitutional conduct
occurred, the Supreme Court held that the City's failure to train
or warn its employees about known risks of harm did not rise to
59 503 U.S. 115.
60 Id. at 122-23.
61 Id. at 117.
62 Id.
63 Id. at 120.
64 Id. at 122-23. As the Court explained:
Although the term 'deliberate indifference' has been used in
other contexts to define the threshold for finding a violation
of the Eighth Amendment ... as we have explained, that
term was used in the Canton case for the quite different
purpose of identifying the threshold for holding a city
responsible for the constitutional torts committed by its
inadequately trained agents.
65 Collins, 503 U.S. at 124.
[Vol 17
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the level of arbitrary or conscious-shocking behavior.' Although
the Court assumed that the City had a duty under Texas State law
to warn employees of dangers as well as to provide education and
training, the Court held that the City's failure to do so was not
arbitrary in a constitutional sense .67 Without conscious-shocking
behavior, there was no underlying constitutional violation.
In County of Sacramento, the Court granted certiorari "to
resolve a conflict among the circuits over the standard of
culpability on the part of a law enforcement officer for violating
substantive due process in a pursuit case. " 68  The decedent in
County of Sacramento was a sixteen-year-old passenger on a
motorcycle driven by a friend. 69 A pursuit took place when the
driver of the motorcycle ignored an officer's attempt to stop him
for speeding .70 The chase reached speeds of one hundred miles
per hour and ended when the motorcycle failed to maneuver a
turn, resulting in both the driver and passenger falling off the
cycle .7  The police officer in pursuit skidded into Lewis,
propelling him seventy feet down the road. Lewis died as a
result of his injuries.72
In addressing the question of what standard of culpability
a plaintiff must demonstrate to maintain a substantive due process
claim in the "pursuit" context, the Court first observed that "the
core of the concept" of due process has always been the notion of
"protection against arbitrary action. "73 What will be considered
"fatally arbitrary," however, will "differ depending on whether
it is legislation or a specific act of a governmental officer that is
at issue. ,74  To establish an executive abuse of power that is
6 Id. at 128. The Court noted that the plaintiff had not alleged willfulness or
deliberate harm or that the supervisor knew or should have known of the
significant risk.
67 Id. at 129.
68 County of Sacramento, 523 U.S. at 839.
69 Id. at 836.
70 Id. at 837.
71 Id.
72 Id.
71 Id. at 845.
74 County of Sacramento, 523 U.S. at 845.
2001
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"fatally arbitrary," the plaintiff will have to demonstrate conduct
that "shocks the conscience. " 75 The Court acknowledged that
"the measure of what is conscience-shocking is no calibrated yard
stick ,"76 and that "the constitutional concept of
conscience-shocking duplicates no traditional category of
common-law fault.", 77 Most likely to rise to the conscience-
shocking level would be "conduct intended to injure in some way
unjustifiable by any government interest. "7
Approving the subjective deliberate indifference standard
applied to substantive due process claims of pretrial detainees
complaining of inadequate attention to health and safety needs,
the Court distinguished high-speed pursuits by law enforcement
officers as presenting "markedly different circumstances." 79 The
Court analogized police officers engaged in sudden police chases
to prison officials facing a riot and concluded:
Just as a purpose to cause harm is needed for
Eighth Amendment liability in a riot case, so it
ought to be needed for Due Process liability in a
pursuit case. Accordingly, we hold that high-speed
chases with no intent to harm suspects physically
or to worsen their legal plight do not give rise to
liability under the Fourteenth Amendment,
redressible by an action under § 1983.s°
Without suggesting improper or malicious motive on the
part of the officer in County of Sacramento, the alleged conduct
" Id. at 854.
76 Id. at 847.
7Id. at 848.
78 Id. at 849.
79 Id. at 851. The Court noted substantial authority for different standards of
culpability being applied to the same constitutional provision. Thus, in the
Eighth Amendment prison context, while deliberate indifference to medical
needs may establish constitutional liability, the Court has required prisoners
asserting excessive force claims in the context of a prison riot to show that the
force was used "maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing
harm." Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320-21 (1986).
go County of Sacramento, 523 U.S. at 854.
562 [Vol 17
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could not be found "conscience-shocking." Thus, as in Collins,
there was no underlying constitutional violation. County of
Sacramento, as Collins, is a case considering the requirements for
making a substantive due process claim under the Constitution. It
is not a case about municipal responsibility under § 1983.
In Simmons v. City of Philadelphia,81 a decision rendered
prior to the Supreme Court's decisions in Collins and County of
Sacramento, suit was brought under § 1983 against the City and
the individual officer who was the "turnkey" on duty when the
plaintiffs son hanged himself after being taken into custody for
public intoxication.82 Municipal liability was asserted on the basis
of a policy or custom of inattention, amounting to deliberate
indifference to the serious medical needs of intoxicated and
potentially suicidal detainees, as well as deliberate indifference in
failing to train officers to detect and to meet those serious
needs. 
83
The jury in Simmons found that the "turnkey" officer,
although negligent, did not violate Simmons' constitutional rights,
but held the City was liable under § 1983.84 One question on
appeal was whether, in light of Heller, the City could be held
liable under § 1983 where the individual, low-level official, was
found not to have violated the decedent's constitutional rights. 
85
In affirming the verdict against the City, Judge (now Chief
Judge) Becker concluded that to establish municipal liability, the
plaintiff must both identify a particular official with policymaking
authority in the area and demonstrate "scienter-like" evidence
with respect to that policymaker. 86 Judge Becker noted that the
plaintiff need not name the specific policymaker as a defendant,
nor obtain a verdict against him to prevail against the
municipality. The plaintiff must only present evidence of the
S947 F.2d 1042.
82 Id. at 1050.
83 id.
14 Id. at 1094-95.
5 Id. at 1059.
86 Id. at 1062-63.
87 Simmons, 947 F.2d at 1065 n.21.
2001
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policymaker's "knowledge and his decisionmaking or
acquiescence. "88
In a concurring opinion, then Chief Judge Sloviter,
objected to the "scienter-like" requirement imposed by Judge
Becker. 89  Judge Sloviter's concern was that insisting upon a
showing of "scienter" would limit § 1983 cases "to those where
plaintiffs can show defendants knew of the constitutional
deprivation and exclud[e] those cases where plaintiffs argue that
defendants should have known of it." 90 Interpreting "scienter" to
require actual knowledge and intentional conduct, Judge Sloviter
concluded the requirement was inconsistent with the Supreme
Court's decision in City of Canton.91
Examining Simmons through the lens of subsequent
Supreme Court decisions, it appears Judge Becker's "scienter-
like" requirement was inconsistent with the objective deliberate
indifference standard of City of Canton. The Canton Court
would hold a municipality liable for constitutional violations
committed by non-policymaking employees, provided that
policymakers knew, or should have known, that their acts or
omissions would cause such constitutional injuries to be inflicted
upon citizens with whom their employees came into contact.
92
Deliberate indifference under City of Canton does not require
actual knowledge or intentional conduct. 93  On the other hand, it
was proper for Judge Becker to insist upon a higher level of
culpability, a "scienter-like" requirement on the part of identified
policymakers, as Simmons was not about a City of Canton-type
derivative statutory liability, but rather, was about the underlying
constitutional violation committed by the City.
In Fagan v. City of Vineland,94 a post-Collins but pre-
County of Sacramento decision, the Third Circuit again held that
a city could be found independently liable for the violation of
88 Id.
89 Id. at 1089 (Sloviter, C.J., concurring in the judgment).
90 Id.
9' Id. at 1091.
92 City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 397.
9' Id. at 398.
94 22 F.3d 1283.
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plaintiffs' constitutional rights. 9  This was true even if the
individual officers were not found liable because they lacked the
requisite mental state to be constitutionally accountable.96 This
case involved a high-speed pursuit that resulted in the deaths of
innocent persons killed by a collision with the pursued vehicle.97
The officers were found not to have acted in a manner that would
satisfy the Supreme Court's Collins-shocks-the-conscience
standard, but the plaintiffs' injuries were linked to City of
Canton-type deliberate indifference on the part of the City.
98
Fagan may not be problematic if the Supreme Court
ultimately decides that when talking about municipal liability, one
cannot argue in terms of subjective deliberate indifference
because the defendant is an "entity." The Court could adopt the
view that if the plaintiffs can demonstrate that policymakers knew
or should have known that a particular policy was going to result
in injury to persons having contact with municipal employees,
that would be sufficient to hold the municipality liable for a
constitutional wrong. To date, the Supreme Court has not yet
done that. In City of Canton, the Court emphasized that there is a
difference between the underlying constitutional wrong and the
notion of the City's liability under § 1983. 99  Absent a
constitutional violation committed by the non-policymaking
employee(s), and with a showing of only City of Canton-type
deliberate indifference, there is simply no constitutional violation,
and therefore, no basis for § 1983 liability on anyone's part. The
Third Circuit's error in Fagan was treating proof of statutory
responsibility under Canton's deliberate indifference theory as
proof of constitutional liability under Collins.'00
9 Id. at 1292.
96 Id.
9' Id. at 1287.
98 Id.
99 City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 389.
'0 See, e.g., Contreras v. City of Chicago, 119 F.3d 1286, 1294 (7th Cir.
1997):
We would first note that much of the plaintiffs' argument
reflects confusion between what constitutes a constitutional
violation and what makes a municipality liable for
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The court in Arnold v. County of Nassau,1°1 a case
involving a sex offender detainee who was held with detainees
that had mental problems, took a similar approach recently. The
detainees conducted a mock trial of the sex offender detainee,
decided he was guilty, and severely and brutally beat him.'02 The
question in Arnold was whether the county could be held liable if
the individual officers on duty were found not to have been
subjectively deliberately indifferent.'o3 The court concluded:
[T]he County could logically be found liable under
§ 1983 in the absence of individual
liability .... [I]n a lack of prison supervision case
against a municipality, a jury can assess whether
the municipality's policymakers responsible for
attending to prisoner safety knew or should have
known that sex offense prisoners or detainees faced
a substantial risk of serious harm, even where
individual liability is not implicated, and whether
the supervisory policies and practices adopted by
these policymakers were deliberately indifferent to
the safety of these vulnerable inmates. 1
04
constitutional violations. Both in the District Court and here
on appeal, the plaintiffs invoked 'failure to train' and
'deliberate indifference' theories as the basis for the
substantive due process claim. . . Notions of 'deliberate
indifference' and 'failure to train,' however, are derived
from municipal liability cases such as [Monell, Canton] and
most recently [Bryan County.] Those cases presume that a
constitutional violation has occurred (typically by a municipal
employee) and then ask whether the municipality itself may
be liable for the violations ... The liability of the City of
Chicago for any deliberate indifference or for failing to train
DCS inspectors is therefore secondary to the basic issue of
whether a constitutional guarantee has been violated.
101 89 F. Supp. 2d 285 (E.D.N.Y. 2000), judgment vacated on other
grounds, 252 F.3d 599 (2d Cir. 2001).
102 Id.
103 Id.
'0' Id. at 304-05.
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The court in Arnold, as the Third Circuit in Fagan,
determined that a showing of objective deliberate indifference
was enough to make out a constitutional violation when shown at
the policy making level.' 05  In reaching its conclusion on
municipal liability independent of an underlying constitutional
violation by the non-policymaking employee, the Arnold court
relied on the Second Circuit opinion in Barrett v. Orange County
Human Rights Commission.10 6 Barrett, however, was not a City
of Canton type case. Barrett was a case brought by a civil rights
commissioner, alleging his dismissal was an impermissible
retaliation for comments he made on matters of public concern.' 
07
The jury in Barrett found that the two individual commissioners
were not liable because they did not have the requisite
"impermissible motive." 108 They found no liability on behalf of
the two individual commissioners sued. 109 The Second Circuit
reasoned that the finding of no liability on the part of the
individual commissioners did not preclude the plaintiff from
holding the commission itself liable. 110 The commission is a
multi-member entity and the plaintiff could establish liability of
the entity by demonstrating the majority of those who voted had
impermissible motive, even if the two named individual
commissioners were found to have not acted improperly. The
Arnold court's reliance on the language in Barrett is confusing
and misleading. The question of entity liability in Barrett is
raised in a completely different context from that in Arnold.
Barrett in no way authorizes a finding of municipal liability based
on a showing of objective deliberate indifference on the part of
policymakers in the absence of any underlying constitutional
violation.
The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit has struggled
with this issue at length and has reached conflicting results in the
course of the litigation of two different high-speed pursuit cases.
105 Id. at 304.
106 194 F.3d 341 (2d Cir. 1999).
107 Id. at 345-46.
108 Id. at 343-44.
109 Id.
110 Id. at 349-50.
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In Williams v. City and County of Denver,' the plaintiff's son
was killed when a police vehicle ran a red light and struck the
decedent's vehicle. 12  At the time of the cpllision, the officer
operating the police vehicle was responding to a non-emergency
request for assistance by another officer. 113 The plaintiff sued
both Officer Farr and the City. 114 The District Court determined
that the officer's conduct did not amount to a constitutional
violation and granted summary judgment for the City on the City
of Canton claims. The District Court also rejected the notion that
the City could be held liable under § 1983, independent of the
officer's liability. In reversing the District Court's holding on the
existence of the underlying constitutional violation, the Court of
Appeals concluded that the officer's conduct could be viewed as
"reckless and conscience-shocking[,]" and therefore, egregious
enough to constitute an underlying substantive due process
violation." 5 However, because the law was not clearly
established at the time of the incident, the court affirmed
summary judgment for the officer based on qualified immunity." 
6
Because there was sufficient evidence to make out an underlying
constitutional violation by Officer Farr, the Court of Appeals also
reversed the summary judgment for the City and remanded for
further proceedings. The Court of Appeals subsequently granted
a rehearing en banc, but, given the Supreme Court's intervening
decisions in Bryan County and County- of Sacramento, vacated its
panel opinion and remanded to the District Court for
reconsideration in light of these two Supreme Court opinions. 117
.. 99 F.3d 1009 (10th Cir. 1996) vacated (in light of County of Sacramento)
by Williams v. City and County of Denver, 140 F.3d 855 (10th Cir. 1997),
remanded by Williams v. City and County of Denver, 153 ,F.3d 730 (10th Cir.
1998) (per curiam) (en banc).
112 Id. at 1012.
113 Id.
114 Williams, 99 F.3d at 1012.
115 Id. at 1017.
116 Id. at 1021.
"17 Williams, 153 F.3d at 737 (per curiam) (en blanc) On remand, the District
Court concluded that because the officer's conduct occurred in a non-
emergency situation, the plaintiff did not have to satisfy County of
Sacramento's "intent to harm" level of culpability in order to establish
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The now vacated panel opinion of the Court of Appeals
also acknowledged that a claim could be asserted directly against
the City on a Collins theory, but affirmed summary judgment for
the City because there was insufficient evidence from which a
jury could find that the City's conduct was "so egregious,
outrageous and fraught with unreasonable risk as to shock the
conscience." 11 8  Thus, the Tenth Circuit's panel opinion in
Williams, recognized that in cases where the plaintiffs underlying
constitutional claim depended upon establishing a particular state
of mind on the part of the non-policymaking employee, there may
be situations in which an officer inflicts the injury, but lacks the
requisite state of mind. In these cases, the plaintiff should be
able to proceed directly against the government entity on a
Collins theory, if the plaintiff demonstrates: (1) that the
policymaker(s) possessed the requisite state of mind required to
make out a constitutional violation and (2) that the policymaker's
acts or omissions were the "moving force" behind the plaintiffs
injury.
In a recent decision, however, a different panel of the
Tenth Circuit rejected the position espoused by the court in
Williams. In Trigalet v. City of Tulsa, 119 the court entertained an
appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).' 20  The specific question
certified to the court was:
conscious-shocking behavior that would violate substantive due process.
Williams v. City and County of Denver, No. 90 N 1176, slip op. at *17 (D.
Colo. Sept. 27, 1999) (on remand). In a tactical decision arrived at to keep
certain evidence regarding Officer Farr's past driving record and other
incidents from the jury, the City stipulated to liability based on a jury
determination of Farr's having violated plaintiffs substantive due process
rights in the incident in question. The jury returned a $2.25 million verdict for
the plaintiff. Post-verdict motions are being entertained at the time of this
writing. The City will no doubt appeal if not successful in its post-trial
motions. (Conversations with Steven Black, one of the attorneys representing
the plaintiff in Williams).
11 Williams, 99 F.3d at 1020.
"9 239 F.3d 1150 (10th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 40 (2001).
12o 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (b) (1994 & Supp. 2001) allows a District Court judge
to certify an order for interlocutory appeal when "such order involves a
controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground for
2001 569
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Whether, under the rationale of Williams v. City
and County of Denver... a municipality can be
held liable if the City's actions can be
characterized as arbitrary, or conscience-shocking,
in a constitutional sense, even if there are no
unconstitutional acts by an individual officer. 121
The court answered the question "in the negative."
122
For purposes of the appeal, which was decided on the briefs
without oral argument, the facts were taken as undisputed. The
plaintiffs in Trigalet were three individuals killed when their
station wagon was hit by a minivan being pursued by officers of
the Tulsa Police Department. 123  The van was pursued for a
stolen vehicle offense. 124 During the course of the pursuit the van
failed to stop for at least eight stop signs in residential areas, by a
park, a high school, and within blocks of the University of
Tulsa. 125 Although policy mandated all pursuits be supervised,
there was no supervision of this pursuit. 126 The testimony of the
manager of safety and equipment for the Tulsa Police Department
reflected that it was permissible and appropriate to pursue any
traffic offender regardless of the offense. 1
27
In the course of the lengthy legal battle, the officers
prevailed on qualified immunity grounds.' 28 It was not clearly
established at the time of the incident that the officers could be
difference of opinion and ... an immediate appeal from the order may
materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation .... .
121 Trigalet, 239 F.3d at 1150-51.
122 Id. at 1151.
123 Id.
124 id.
125 Id. (The Court of Appeals referenced the content of the unreported
District Court order of August, 1998). The plaintiffs alleged that five elements
of the policies and practices of the Tulsa Police Department with respect to
pursuits made those policies and practices conscience shocking and arbitrary in
a constitutional sense.
26 id. at 1151.
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liable under § 1983 for injuries caused by third parties.121
Following the Supreme Court's decision in County of
Sacramento, the District Court granted summary judgment to the
City on plaintiffs' City of Canton, derivative liability claim.
130
However, the court denied summary judgment on the direct
liability claim; the claim that the City of Tulsa could be found to
have directly violated plaintiffs' constitutional rights through
policies and practices characterized as arbitrary or conscience
shocking.' 3  The District Court relied on the distinction drawn
by the panel in the vacated Williams opinion, noting that while
the opinion had been vacated, "'its distinction between direct and
indirect municipal liability is still valid and persuasive."' 
132
The Court of Appeals in Trigalet concluded that without a
"predicate constitutional violation" by an employee, the
municipality cannot be found liable. 33 The panel relied on the
Supreme Court's decisions in Heller, County of Sacramento, and
Bryan County, as well as a number of its own decisions and other
circuits rejecting municipal liability absent a finding of a
constitutional violation by an employee.' 34 Because there was no
evidence of the requisite purpose to harm on the part of the
officers participating in the pursuit in Trigalet, there was no
constitutional injury inflicted by them, and thus, no basis for a
finding of municipal liability. As the court stated:
In sum, we hold that absent a constitutional
violation by the individual police officers whose
conduct directly caused plaintiffs' injuries, there
can be no municipal liability imposed on the City
of Tulsa on account of its policies, customs, and/or
129 Id.
130 Id.
131 Id. at 1152.
132 Id. (Court of Appeals quoting from unreported district court Order of
August, 1998).
133 Tigalet, 239 F.3d at 1154.
134 Id. at 1154-55.
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supervision with regard to the individual
defendants. 1
3 5
This author would suggest that if the panel in Trigalet was
right, it is indeed time, as Justice Breyer suggested in Bryan
County, to revisit Monell. 136 Assume Tulsa's policy-makers had
adopted a pursuit policy that not only allowed pursuits for any
traffic offense, but also authorized the use of any means
necessary to bring the offender under control and into custody.
Additionally, assume that pursuant to this policy, Officers Rip
and Roar pursue a traffic offender and engage in a high-speed
pursuit. Assume that Officer Rip, consistent with the City's
policy and his training, fires a few rounds at the tires of the
fleeing vehicle, and while unsuccessful in bringing the vehicle to
a stop, does manage to hit an innocent bystander with a stray
bullet. If the driver of the vehicle had been seized, 137 she no
doubt would have had a good claim for use of unreasonable force
under the Fourth Amendment. The bystander, however, has not
been seized within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, 138 and
would have only a substantive due process claim under County of
Sacramento. Should a failure to make out the requisite "purpose
to harm" on the part of the acting officers preclude the bystander
from asserting a claim against the City based on the subjective
deliberate indifference of its policyrnakers in adopting a policy
they knew was likely to result in serious injuries to citizens who
were subjected to or in the vicinity of police pursuits?
I35 d. at 1155.
136 Bryan County, 520 U.S. at 430 (Breyer, J., joined by Ginsburg, J., and
Stevens, J., dissenting). In Bryan County, Justice Breyer, joined by Justices
Ginsburg and Stevens, authored a dissent that criticized the "highly complex
body of interpretive law" that has developed to maintain and perpetuate the
distinction adopted in Monell between direct and vicarious liability, and called
for a reexamination of "the legal soundness of that basic distinction itself."
137 In California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621 (1991), the Court held that a
police pursuit does not amount to a "seizure" within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment.
138 See Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 596-97 (1989) (Fourth
Amendment seizure occurs only when there is a government termination of
freedom of movement through means intentionally applied).
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While there is some justification for setting a high
threshold of culpability for plaintiffs to meet before recovery is
allowed against individual officers engaged in rapidly-developing,
emergency-type situations, there is no legitimate reason to apply
the same level of culpability to the conduct of policymakers who
intentionally and knowingly adopt a course of action that is
deliberately indifferent to citizens' health, safety and welfare. If
a jury should determine that the criticized elements of the City's
pursuit policy did indeed make the policy arbitrary and
conscience-shocking, and were deliberately and knowingly
adopted or ratified by the City's policymakers, the City should be
held directly liable for having violated the substantive due process
rights of plaintiffs. Although the officers inflicted the physical
injury, the policymakers committed the constitutional violation.
The courts in Simmons and Williams had the right theory. County
of Sacramento clarifies that, in a context where there is time and
opportunity to deliberate, subjective deliberate indifference will
suffice to establish a substantive due process violation. A finding
of direct municipal liability based on the subjective deliberate
indifference of policymakers to the safety of citizens is consistent
with Monell, City of Canton and County of Sacramento.
2001
23
Blum: Municipal Liability under 1983
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2001
TOURO LAW REVIEW
[This page intentionally left blank.]
[Vol 17
24
Touro Law Review, Vol. 17 [2001], No. 3, Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol17/iss3/4
